
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Director of
Central
Intelligence





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## National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

8 July 1982

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	ISRAEL-LEBANON: Renewed Fighting
	(Information as of 2300 EDT)
	The renewed fighting in Beirut yesterday could jeopardize negotiations on the fate of Palestinian forces in Lebanon.
	Israel's tactic of advancing and improving the positions of its forces, drawing fire from the Palestinians, and then returning the fire continue to provoke violations of the cease-fire.
Γ	or the cease-fife.
L	
	//All crossing points from East to West Beirut re-
	mained closed yesterday, but the Israelis reportedly
	allowed emergency food shipments to pass through the port
	crossing. Electricity was restored yesterday to some parts
	of West Beirut, and a limited water supply reportedly
	also is available in West Beirut.//
	Political Developments
	-
	According to press reports, PLO leaders have agreed
	-
	According to press reports, PLO leaders have agreed to evacuate Beirut if they are allowed to maintain a
	According to press reports, PLO leaders have agreed to evacuate Beirut if they are allowed to maintain a military and political presence behind Syrian lines in
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Soviet Media Commentary	
Moscow on Tuesday called the announcement of possible US participation in an international peacekeeping force in West Beirut a "dangerous" development and asserted that Washington is seeking to supplement the Israeli occupation. The Soviets discussed the implications of the US proposal in only general terms.	
Comment: The Soviets probably want to gauge Arab and especially Syrian and Palestinian reaction before establishing guidelines for their own propaganda.	
continued	

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VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA: Troop Withdrawal Proposal	
Vietnam has announced a partial withdrawal of its troops from Kampuchea and proposed an international conference to address the issue of regional stability in Southeast Asia.	5X1
The two initiatives were the centerpieces of a communique issued at the conclusion in Ho Chi Minh City yesterday of a two-day conference of Indochinese foreign ministers. The number of troops to be withdrawn was not cited, although the offer stated they would be removed by the end of this month.	5X1
In addition, the Vietnamese-led conference reiterated calls for a demilitarized zone along the Thai-Kampuchean border; talks between Thailand and the Indochinese states on questions of common concern; withdrawal of UN recognition of Democratic Kampuchea and its coalition successor; and UN acquiescence to a vacant seat in the General Assembly.	5X1
	5X1 5X1
//Vietnam is likely to continue its efforts in this vein up to the meeting of the General Assembly this fall, when the question of seating the Kampuchean re- sistance will again arise. Hanoi's recent actions may be partly motivated by a desire to move the focus of discussions on Kampuchea away from the UN.//	5 <u>X1</u> 5 <u>X1</u>
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BELGIUM-USSR: Possible Gas Purchase	
//Belgium may import Soviet gas if an alter for additional gas from the Netherlands cannot be	
//The Belgians and Soviets already hagreement on terms of a gas contract, who been signed. It calls for Belgium to buy cubic meters of Soviet gas annually from and 2.5 billion cubic meters annually from	ich has not yet y 500 million 1986 to 1991
//Brussels would prefer to buy Dutch Dutch reportedly are offering unattractive Prime Minister van Agt has directed his to review the negotiations because van Agwould be politically preferable for Belgingas from the Dutch. Additional Belgian-Ewill be held this week.//	ve terms. Dutch cop economic aide gt believes it ium to obtain
Comment: //Although The Hague may be compromise on some issues, the interim go ably will delay a final decision for sever The Netherlands could use the revenues from the help cover the increasing costs of some contents.	overnment prob- eral more weeks. com extra sales
The Belgians hope that the US, because about the Soviet pipeline, will urge the a better offer. If the Dutch cannot improve and Moscow agrees to increase purchases of Brussels is likely to buy Soviet gas. Be depend on the Soviets for almost one-fift supplies, and Moscow would earn about \$500 year in the 1990s.	Dutch to make cove their offer of Belgian goods, elgium would then the of its gas

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
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HONDURAS: Terrorist Actions
Salvadoran insurgents were responsible for the well-coordinated terrorist bombings on Sunday of Tegucigalpa's major electrical power plants and the destruction on Saturday of the Costa Rican office of the Honduran airline. President Suazo and Army Commander in Chief Alvarez plan a joint address tomorrow to blame the Salvadoran guerrillas for the incidents and to pledge an intensified fight against the rise in both domestic leftist and foreign terrorism
in Honduras.
In honduras.
Comment: //The Salvadoran guerrillas are retaliating against Honduras for its support of recent Salvadoran military operations. The Honduran armed forces are resolved to continue this support, and terrorist violence and cooperation among regional leftists in Honduras are likely to increase. The latest incidents and the need to restore service to the 500,000 residents in Tegucigalpa who are still without electricity or water will heighten Suazo's sense of concern during his official visit to

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Washington next week.//

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SOUTH AFRICA: Cabinet Changes

Prime Minister Botha this week dropped one of the cabinet's most conservative ministers, Post and Telecommunications Minister Smit, and appointed moderates to fill this vacancy and two others that were created when rightwing cabinet members left the National Party last March to form the first Afrikaner opposition party. The changes, which go into effect on 2 August, include shifting Minister of Mines and Energy de Klerk to the Ministry of Interior and moving Interior Minister Heunis to the new post of Minister of Constitutional Development.

Comment: Botha is continuing to surround himself with officials who support his plans to alter the constitution to give some political rights to South Africa's Colored and Asian minorities. By moving Heunis, a trusted political lieutenant, to the Ministry of Constitutional Development, Botha is signaling his intention to speed up the process. As Minister of Interior, de Klerk will have to sell the government's new proposals to Coloreds and Asians as well as to his own followers in the heavily populated and conservative Transvaal Province, where he is the provincial party leader.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS	
PHILIPPINES: The Insurgent Threat	
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//Manila faces internal security threats from a based insurgency led by the Communist Party of the Phi People's Army and a less active Muslim rebellion in the Philippines led by the Moro National Liberation Front. be urged to support Manila's counterinsurgency efforts few years by providing more military equipment and support Manila's counterinsurgency end support few years by providing more military equipment and support Manila's counterinsurgency end support few years by providing more military equipment and support few years by providing more military equipment and support few years by providing more military equipment and support few years by providing more military equipment and support few years by providing more military equipment and support few years by providing more military equipment and support few years by providing more military equipment and support few years by providing more military equipment and support few years by the More few years by providing more military equipment and years by the More few years by providing more few years by the More	lippines' New e southern The US will in the n <u>ext</u>
//The frequency and scope of insurgent acout by the New People's Army grew considerably Guerrilla attacks were up at least 30 percent and conservative Philippine military estimates total number of armed insurgents at the end of approximately 6,000, or roughly double the estimates.//	y last year. over 1980, s place the f 1981 at
//The New People's Army is widely dispers the nation's 73 provinces and able to mobilize numbers of guerrillas in most areas. It usual in six- to 12-man squads that carry out ambust killings of selected government officials, mile personnel and landowners.//	e only small lly operates hes and
//Incidents involving the Muslim rebels have been hindered by factionalism casualties, and apparent problems obtaining for weapons from radical states and groups in the	, defections, unds and
Causes of Unrest	
The deteriorating rural economy and polition are the major factors that enable the New Army to increase its activity. Communist Part are exploiting depressed prices for sugar, coo other cash crops that have eroded already low standards.	v People's cy leaders , conuts and
-	continued
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base of suppor longstanding ment funds to reportedly is President Marc of moderate op alternative to front activiti in the country	t has been made much reglect in providing remote areas, where corganizing shadow poleos's political dominates to position parties to him are encouraging tes in the cities and	resources and develop- the Communist Party litical organizations. ance and the inability
rebels has all and concentrat Army. The mil by poor troop budget cutback strategy. Mor the civilian p	owed it to move troop e on areas infested be itary's effectiveness mobility, manpower ares, and the lack of a eover, the military's copulation benefits the will find it more differry if the insurgents	by the New People's s, however, is hampered and equipment shortages, coherent overall s reputation for abusing ane insurgents.//
CATCHIAL SUPPO	1 0 0	
add to the gov between them a if not gradual National Liber	ernment's problems. lready exists and is ly expand. Despite i ation Front can still	its setbacks, the Moro
Looking Ahead		
move into urba party will acc laborers and i	n areas in the next felerate recruiting an	mong students and agh urban groups may be
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be able to sustain their current momentum over the near term. The economy will continue to offer the Communists a major issue to exploit.//
//Manila is likely to request increased US military assistance to combat the insurgency. At the same time, the New People's Army almost certainly will attempt to convince the Filipinos that there is a link between increased US military aid and the abusive behavior of government troops in rural areas. Growing US involvement in Manila's counterinsurgency efforts would increase the risk of insurgent attacks against US military personnel and facilities or economic targets.//

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